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Abstract In this research, the optimal pricing decisions for
two complementary products in a two-echelon supply chain
under two scenarios are studied. The proposed supply chain
in each echelon includes one retailer and two manufacturers
and the same complementary products are produced. In the
first scenario, we assume the unit manufacturing costs of the
complementary products in each echelon are the same, while
in the second one the different unit manufacturing costs are
supposed and lead to demand leakage from the echelon with
the higher unit manufacturing cost to the echelon with the
lower unit manufacturing cost. Moreover, under the second
scenario, the products with lower price are replaced with the
higher price products. The purpose of this study is to analyze
the effects of different market powers between the manu-
facturers and the retailer and the demand leakage on the
optimal wholesale and retail prices and also on the profit of
the chain. The relationships between the manufacturers and
the retailer are modeled by the MS-Stackelberg and MS-
Bertrand game-theoretic approach where the manufacturers
are leaders and the retailers are followers.
Keywords Pricing  Complementary products  Market
power  MS-Stackelberg game  MS-Bertrand game
Introduction and literature review
Market power as the principal companies’ success factors
is a primitive and important challenge to which companies
are faced. The companies, which are competing in the same
market, are attempting to increase own market penetrations
by using different implements to achieve the more market
power than the other rivals. The market power leads to
enhance the penetrability of companies so that the market
would be handled by the powerful firms (Wei et al. 2013;
Zhao et al. 2014). One of the practical and the efficient
implements which cause to improve the companies’ rev-
enue and also their power market is presenting an optimal
price where the same products are launched to the market.
So, pricing policy as the useful tool which can solve this
imperative problem is recognized by enterprises for dec-
ades. In fact, the companies attempt to optimize their
selling prices to acquire the more market demand.
Recently, many researchers are focused on the pricing
policies. For instance, Starr and Rubinson (1978) proposed
a model to survey the relation between the demand of
product and its prices. Dada and Srikanth (1987) studied
pricing policies under quantity discounts. Kim and lee
(1998) employed pricing and ordering strategies for a
single item with fixed or variable capacity to maximize the
profit of firm faced to price-sensitive and deterministic
demand over a planning horizon. Boyaci and Gallego
(2002) considered joint pricing and ordering decisions in a
supply chain consisting of a wholesaler and one or several
retailers. A complete review of dynamic pricing models
was presented by Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003).
Several studies applied pricing policy with coordination
mechanisms under different assumptions (Chen and Sim-
chi-Levi 2004a, b, 2006; Chen et al. (2006); Xiao et al.
(2010); Wei and Zhao (2011); Yu and Ma (2013); Maihami
and Karimi (2014); Taleizadeh and Noori-daryan (2014)).
Sinha and Sarmah (2010) studied pricing decisions in a
distribution channel under the competition and coordina-
tion issues in which two competitive vendors sell products
to a common retailer in the same market. A comprehensive
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review of pricing models for a multi-product system is
performed by Soon (2011). Shavandi et al. (2012) pre-
sented a new constrained pricing and inventory model for
perishable products which those are classified to comple-
mentary, substitutable and independent products. Their aim
is to optimize the prices, inventory and production deci-
sions such that the total profit is maximized. Mahmoodi
and Eshghi (2014) presented three algorithms to obtain the
optimal pricing decisions in a duopoly supply chain.
Taleizadeh et al. (2014) developed a vendor managed
inventory (VMI) model in a two-level supply chain
including a vendor and multiple retailers to survey the
optimal pricing and inventory policies such that the total
profit of the chain is maximized.
The concept of complementary products is suggested
when the customer has to purchase more than one product
at the same time so that the products could have the
required efficiency (Yue et al. 2006). For an instance,
software and hardware systems of a computer are two
complementary products and should be purchased together
to have the required efficiency for the customer. But, if a
customer is not satisfied enough with a purchased product
and purchases a similar product, then these two products
will be substitutable products. For example; different
marks of software or hardware systems of a computer may
be considered as substitutable products. Several researchers
examine the effects of complementary and substi-
tutable products on the profit of inventory systems. For
example, the pricing decisions of two complementary
products as the bundle policy is studied by Yue et al.
(2006) where the products are produced by two separate
firms. Mukhopadhyay et al. (2011) considered a duopoly
market where two independent firms offer complementary
goods under information asymmetry. The Stackelberg
game-theoretic model to solve the proposed model is uti-
lized. Yan and Bandyopadhyay (2011) proposed a profit-
maximization model and applied a bundle pricing policy
for complementary items. Wei et al. (2013) examined the
pricing problem under the different market powers struc-
tures between members of a supply chain with two man-
ufacturers and one retailer for two complementary
products. Wang et al. (2014) employed pricing policy for
two complementary products in a fuzzy environment and
they survey the changes of the optimal retail prices of two
complementary products under two different scenarios.
Wei et al. (2015) presented joint optimal pricing and
warranty period of two complementary products in a sup-
ply chain with two manufacturers and one common retailer
under horizontal firm’s cooperation/noncooperation
strategies.
Tang and Yin (2007) extended the Starr and Rubinson
(1978)’s work for two substitutable products under the
fixed and variable pricing strategies. The goal of this paper
is to jointly determine optimal order quantity and retail
price. Hsieh and Wu (2009) and Gurler and Yilmaz (2010)
employed coordinating mechanisms for substitutable prod-
ucts under various assumptions. Then two problems are
carried out by Zhao et al. (2012a, b) such that in the first
one, a pricing problem of substitutable products in a fuzzy
environment is discussed. In the second one, a pricing
policy in a supply chain including one manufacturer and
two competitive retailers for substitutable products where
the customers’ demand and the manufacturing costs are
non-deterministic is employed. Chen et al. (2013) dis-
cussed pricing problem for substitutable products under
traditional and online channels in a two-stage supply chain
including a manufacturer and a retailer where the manu-
facturer sells a product to a retailer and also sells directly to
customers through an online channel. Hsieh et al. (2014)
surveyed pricing and ordering decisions of partners of a
supply chain including multiple manufacturers and a
retailer under demand uncertainty where each manufac-
turer produces a different substitutable product which is
sold through the retailer. Zhao et al. (2014) developed a
pricing model for substitutable products under the different
market power of firms in a supply chain with two com-
petitive manufacturers and a retailer. Fei et al. (2015)
considered a price model for one supplier and multiple
retailers under different product substitution degrees. In
this article, the authors studied the effect of sub-packaging
cost on the retail price.
Panda et al. (2015) studied joint pricing and replenish-
ment policies in a dual-channel supply chain where the
manufacturer is the leader of Stackelberg model. Zhang
et al. (2014) developed a dynamic pricing model in a
competitive supply chain under deterministic demand
function to optimize the benefits of supply chain members.
Also, they analyzed the profit sensitivity with respect to
various factors. Giri and Sharma (2014) developed pricing
model under cooperative and non-cooperative advertising
in a supply chain with a single manufacturer and two
competitive retailers. Consumer demand function depends
on price and advertising. They show that cooperative
advertising policy is more beneficial.
After reviewing comprehensively pricing problems of
complementary and substitutable products, we found
although several pricing models are developed to optimize
the profit or cost of the inventory systems for comple-
mentary and substitutable products, the pricing problem of
both complementary and substitutable products in a two-
echelon supply chain with market power and demand
leakage considerations is not discussed.
In this paper, a pricing model of complementary and
substitutable products in a two-echelon supply chain in
which each echelon including two manufacturers and one
retailer under demand leakage is developed, where the
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different market powers are assumed for the chain mem-
bers. Two different game-theoretic approaches including
MS-Stackelberg and MS-Bertrand are employed to exam-
ine the pricing decisions of the chain members when the
market power is different and subsequently demand leaks
from one echelon to the second one.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The
problem is described in Sect. 2. The model is formulated in
Sect. 3. Section 4 provides solution methods under MS-
Stackelberg and MS-Bertrand game-theoretic approaches.
Sections 5 and 6 contain a numerical example, sensitivity
analysis and conclusion as a summary of findings and some
future researches.
Problem description
Consider a two-echelon supply chain including one retailer
and two manufacturers in every echelon where each ech-
elon supplies two complementary products. In the first
echelon, manufacturers 1 and 2, respectively, produce two
complementary products 1 and 2 and wholesale the prod-
ucts to retailer 1. Then retailer 1 sells the products 1 and 2
to the customers. In the second one, manufacturers 3 and 4
produce two complementary products 3 and 4 and whole-
sale them to retailer 2. Therefore, retailer 2 sells the
products 3 and 4 to the customers. We assume two com-
plementary products produced in each echelon of supply
chain are the same such that products 1 and 3 and products
2 and 4 are the same.
In other words, based on Fig. 1 in which the schema of
the supply chain is shown, the manufacturer i produces
product i at unit manufacturing cost Ci and sells it to
retailer j at unit wholesale price Wi. Afterward, the
retailer j sells the product i to end users at unit retail price
Pi where in the first echelon i ¼ 1; 2 j ¼ 1 and in the
second echelon i ¼ 3; 4 j ¼ 2. Moreover, we assume that
if the unit manufacturing cost Ci is different in each
echelon of supply chain, the demand leakage from the
echelon with the higher unit manufacturing cost to the
echelon with lower unit manufacturing cost occurs.
Therefore, the products 1 and 3 and also the products 2
and 4 will be transacted in the market as the substi-
tutable products. This scheme can be used for software
and hardware systems of a computer as described in
previous section. These products are complementary and
are produced by manufacturers 3 and 4, as different
brands, respectively. So, if a customer is not satisfied
enough from the purchased products of manufacturer 1
and 2, then products 1 and 3 and products 2 and 4 will be
substitutable products.
The assumptions utilized to model the discussed prob-
lem are as follows.
1. Demand is deterministic and price-sensitive.
2. The same complementary products are produced in
each echelon.
3. In the first model, the same unit manufacturing costs
are considered for each echelon.
4. In the second model, different unit manufacturing costs
are assumed for each echelon which is caused demand
leakage between two echelons of the chain. So, the
product with the higher unit manufacturing cost will be
substituted by the products with the lower unit
manufacturing cost.
5. The higher market power is assumed for the manufac-
turers than the retailer in each echelon so that the
market is managed by the manufacturers.
6. Shortage is not allowed.
7. All the parameters are deterministic and positive.
The main aim of this paper is to study the optimal
pricing policies in a two-echelon supply chain for two
complementary products under two scenarios with the
different market powers of each echelon partners. Two
manufacturers and one retailer are the partners of each
echelon and the problem is to determine the optimal values
of wholesale prices of the manufacturers and the selling
prices of the retailers to maximize the profit of the chain.

















Fig. 1 A two-echelon supply
chain
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Parameters
Ci The unit manufacturing cost of product i;
Ai The primary demand of customers for product i;
bii The self-price sensitivity for the demand of ith
product respect to its own price;
bij The cross price sensitivities for the demand of ith
product respect to the price of jth product j, bii[ bij;
L1 The factor of demand leakage between products 1
and 3;
L2 The factor of demand leakage between products 2
and 4;
Di The demand rate of customers for product i under the
first scenario;
D0i The demand rate of customers for product i under the
second scenario;
pmi The profit function of manufacturer i under the first
scenario;
p0mi The profit function of manufacturer i under the
second scenario;
prj The profit function of retailer j under the first
scenario;
p0rj The profit function of retailer j under the second
scenario;
Decision variables
Wi The wholesale price of product i per unit, ($);
Pi The retail price of product i per unit, ($)
The optimal values of the decision variables of themodels
under the both scenarios are shown by sign (*). In addition,
some notations utilized to model the first and the second
models are defined in Appendices 1 and 2, respectively.
Mathematical model
In this section, two pricing models for the complementary
products with and without demand leakage considerations
in a two-echelon supply chain are developed where two
manufacturers and one retailer are the partners of each
echelon.
The first model: without demand leakage
In this model, the same unit manufacturing costs are con-
sidered for the manufacturers of each echelon. So, the
demand leakage between two echelons is not occurred.
Thus, the demand functions of complementary products 1,
2, 3, and 4 are formulated as follows.
D1 ¼ A1  b11P1  b12P2 ð1Þ
D2 ¼ A2  b22P2  b21P1 ð2Þ
D3 ¼ A3  b33P3  b34P4 ð3Þ
D4 ¼ A4  b44P4  b43P3 ð4Þ
And the profit functions of the manufacturers and the
retailers are represented as follows.
pm1 W1ð Þ ¼ W1  C1ð Þ A1  b11P1  b12P2½  ð5Þ
pm2 W2ð Þ ¼ W2  C2ð Þ A2  b22P2  b21P1½  ð6Þ
pr1 P1;P2ð Þ ¼ P1 W1ð Þ A1  b11P1  b12P2½ 
þ P2 W2ð Þ A2  b22P2  b21P1½  ð7Þ
pm3 W3ð Þ ¼ W3  C3ð Þ A3  b33P3  b34P4½  ð8Þ
pm4 W4ð Þ ¼ W4  C4ð Þ A4  b44P4  b43P3½  ð9Þ
pr2 P3;P4ð Þ ¼ P3 W3ð Þ A3  b33P3  b34P4½ 
þ P4 W4ð Þ A4  b44P4  b43P3½  ð10Þ
The second model with demand leakage
In this case, a symmetrical demand leakage between two
echelons of supply chain due to the different unit manu-
facturing costs of two echelons is considered. The demand
leakage occurs between products 1 and 3 and also between
products 2 and 4. As a result, products 1 and 3 and products
2 and 4 can be traded as the substitutable products. So, the
demand functions of products 1, 2, 3, and 4 are obtained as
follows:
D01 ¼ A1  b1P1  L1 P1  P3ð Þ ð11Þ
D02 ¼ A2  b2P2  L2 P2  P4ð Þ ð12Þ
D03 ¼ A3  b3P3 þ L1 P1  P3ð Þ ð13Þ
D04 ¼ A4  b4P4 þ L2 P2  P4ð Þ ð14Þ
Meanwhile, the following relationships are established
between bii,bij, and Li
bii ¼ bi þ Li ð15Þ
bij ¼ Li ð16Þ
Hence, the profit functions of the manufacturers and
retailers are represented as follows:
p0m1 W1ð Þ ¼ W1  C1ð Þ A1  b1P1  L1 P1  P3ð Þ½  ð17Þ
p0m2 W2ð Þ ¼ W2  C2ð Þ A2  b2P2  L2 P2  P4ð Þ½  ð18Þ
p0r1 P1;P2ð Þ ¼ P1 W1ð Þ A1  b1P1  L1 P1  P3ð Þ½ 
þ P2 W2ð Þ A2  b2P2  L2 P2  P4ð Þ½ 
ð19Þ
p0m3 W3ð Þ ¼ W3  C3ð Þ A3  b3P3 þ L1 P1  P3ð Þ½  ð20Þ
p0m4 W4ð Þ ¼ W4  C4ð Þ A4  b4P4 þ L2 P2  P4ð Þ½  ð21Þ
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p0r2 P3;P4ð Þ ¼ P3 W3ð Þ A3  b3P3 þ L1 P1  P3ð Þ½ 
þ P4 W4ð Þ A4  b4P4 þ L2 P2  P4ð Þ½ 
ð22Þ
Solution method
For solving the on hand problem, the MS game-theoretic
approach is applied, in which the followers first make
decision about their decision variables and then the leaders
determine the optimal values of own decision variables
according to the best reaction of the followers. Here, we
consider the manufacturers as the Stackelberg leaders and
the retailers as Stackelberg followers where the wholesale
prices of the manufacturers and the retail prices of the
retailers are the decision variables of the introduced model.
So, the manufacturers have more market powers than the
retailers and also the market is leaded by the manufactur-
ers. Meanwhile, the theory of MS game consists of two
practical approaches which are known as the MS-Bertrand
and the MS-Stackelberg models. In this section, we intend
to obtain the optimal values of the decision variables by
employing the MS-Bertrand and the MS-Stackelberg
models under both scenarios.
The MS-Bertrand model
Based on the MS-Bertrand approach, although the manu-
facturers as the leader have more market power than the
retailers as the followers, in each echelon of supply chain
the manufacturers have the same power and they move,
simultaneously. The solution algorithm of MS-Bertrand
model is presented in Fig. 2.
The first model under the MS-Bertrand approach
According to the MS-Bertrand solution algorithm, the
optimal values of selling prices of four products versus the
wholesale prices are obtained as follows:
P1 W1;W2ð Þ ¼ F1 þ F2W1 þ F3W2 ð23Þ
P2 W1;W2ð Þ ¼ F4 þ F5 W1 þ F6 W2 ð24Þ
P3 W3;W4ð Þ ¼ U1 þ U2 W3 þ U3W4 ð25Þ
P4 W3;W4ð Þ ¼ U4 þ U5 W3 þ U6 W4 ð26Þ
Substituting Eqs. (23)–(26) into the manufacturer’s
profit function, the optimal values of wholesale prices of
products are acquired as follows:
W1 ¼
E1E6  E2E3
E4E6  E5E3 ð27Þ
W2 ¼
E2E4  E1E5
E4E6  E5E3 ð28Þ
W3 ¼
G1G6  G2G3
G4G6  G5G3 ð29Þ
W4 ¼
G2G4  G1G5
G4G6  G5G3 ð30Þ
Then, by substituting Eqs. (27)–(30) into Eqs. (23)–
(26), the independent optimal selling prices can be
obtained as:
































The second model under the MS-Bertrand approach
According to the MS-Bertrand solution algorithm, the
optimal retail prices of four products versus the wholesale
prices of the manufacturers are obtained as follows:
P1 W1;W3ð Þ ¼ K1 þ K2W3 þ K3W1 ð35Þ
P2 W2;W4ð Þ ¼ K4 þ K5W4 þ K6W2 ð36Þ
P3 W1;W3ð Þ ¼ K7 þ K8W1 þ K3W3 ð37Þ
P4 W2;W4ð Þ ¼ K9 þ K10W2 þ K6W4 ð38Þ
Substituting Eqs. (35)–(38) into the profit functions of
manufacturers, the optimal values of wholesale prices are
acquired as follows:
Fig. 2 The MS-Bertrand algorithm




N4N6  N5N3 ð39Þ
W2 ¼
N7N12  N8N9
N10N12  N11N9 ð40Þ
W3 ¼
N2N4  N1N5
N4N6  N5N5 ð41Þ
W4 ¼
N8N10  N7N11
N10N12  N11N9 ð42Þ
Therefore, by substituting Eqs. (39)–(42) into
Eqs. (35)–(38), the optimal retail prices can be obtained
independently as:

































Under this approach, the manufacturers, because of the
more market powers, are considered as the leaders of
Stackelberg and the retailers are considered as the fol-
lowers. Moreover, in each echelon of supply chain, the
manufacturers don’t have the similar powers and they
sequentially make decisions about own decision variables.
Also the Stackelberg game is current between them such
that one of the manufacturers plays the role of the
Stackelberg leader and the other one is the follower of
Stackelberg. The figurative MS-Stackelberg solution
algorithm is indicated in Fig. 3 in which manufacturer i is
the leader and manufacturer j is the follower.
The first model under the MS-Stackelberg approach
Based on the MS-Stackelberg algorithm, the optimal values
of selling prices of four products versus the wholesale
prices of manufacturers are obtained, similar to the MS-
Bertrand model, as follows:
P1 W1;W2ð Þ ¼ F1 þ F2W1 þ F3W2 ð47Þ
P2 W1;W2ð Þ ¼ F4 þ F5W1 þ F6W2 ð48Þ
P3 W3;W4ð Þ ¼ U1 þ U2W3 þ U3W4 ð49Þ
P4 W3;W4ð Þ ¼ U4 þ U5W3 þ U6W4 ð50Þ
Since in the first echelon manufacturer 1 is the leader
and manufacturer 2 is the follower, so by substituting
Eqs. (47) and (48) into the profit functions of manufacturer











Then by substituting Eq. (52) into Eq. (51), the optimal










In the second echelon of supply chain, manufacturer 3 is
the leader and manufacturer 4 is the follower. Afterward,
by substituting Eqs. (49) and (50) into the profit functions
of the second echelon manufacturers, the optimal whole-










Hence, the optimal value of manufacturer 4 is derived
by substituting Eq. (55) into Eq. (54) as follows:
Fig. 3 The MS-Stackelberg algorithm











Therefore, by substituting Eqs. (52)–(56) into
Eqs. (47)–(50), the independent retailers’ optimal retail
prices are obtained which are:
















































The second model under MS-Stackelberg approach
Based on the MS-Stackelberg algorithm, the optimal selling
prices of four products versus the wholesale prices, which
are obtained as the MS-Bertrand model, are as follows.
P1 W1;W3ð Þ ¼ K1 þ K2W3 þ K3W1 ð61Þ
P2 W2;W4ð Þ ¼ K4 þ K5W4 þ K6W2 ð62Þ
P3 W1;W3ð Þ ¼ K7 þ K8W1 þ K3W3 ð63Þ
P4 W2;W4ð Þ ¼ K9 þ K10W2 þ K6W4 ð64Þ
According to the assumptions, a symmetrical demand
leakage occurs between two echelons of supply chain on the
same products because of different unit manufacturing costs
in the echelons. The demand leakage occurs between products
1 and 3 and also products 2 and 4. Here, we assume that the
unit manufacturing costs of manufacturers 1 and 2 are larger
thanmanufacturers 3 and 4. So, themanufacturers 1 and 2 lost
their demand and themanufacturers 3 and 4 against earnmore
demands due to their lower unit manufacturing costs.
Therefore, manufacturers 3 and 4 handle the market
owing to having the more powers than the other ones. As a
result, manufacturers 3 and 4 are the Stackelberg leaders
and manufacturers 1 and 2 are the Stackelberg followers.
Thus, by substituting Eqs. (61) and (63) into the profit
functions of manufacturers, the optimal wholesale price of










Then, the optimal value of unit wholesale price of
manufacturer 1is obtained by substituting Eq. (66) into










Furthermore, by substituting Eqs. (62) and (64) into the
objective functions of manufacturers 2 and 4, the optimal










In addition, the optimal unit wholesale price of manu-











Eventually, by substituting Eqs. (66)–(70) into
Eqs. (61)–(64), the retailers’ optimal unit retail prices can
be obtained independently, as follows:
















































Numerical example and sensitivity analysis
In this section, a numerical example for a two-echelon
supply chain including two manufacturers and one retailer
in each echelon is presented. According to the assumption,
the model is developed for two complementary products
and price-sensitive demand. In addition, the discussed
problem is formulated under two different scenarios where
the MS-Stackelberg and the MS-Bertrand solution algo-
rithms are employed to solve them. In this example, we
consider A1 ¼ A2 ¼ 180, A3 ¼ A4 ¼ 220, C1 ¼ C2 ¼ 25,
C3 ¼ C4 ¼ 20, b11 ¼ b33 ¼ 0:5, b22 ¼ b44 ¼ 0:6,
b12 ¼ b21 ¼ 0:3, b34 ¼ b43 ¼ 0:35, b13 ¼ b31 ¼ 0:3,
b24 ¼ b42 ¼ 0:35 and the results are shown in Tables 1 and
2.
The findings obtained from Table 1 are summarized as
follows.
• According to the obtained results of the first model,
retailers 1 and 2 achieve their highest optimal retail
prices for products 1 and 3 under the MS-Stackelberg
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approach and also for products 2 and 4 under the MS-
Bertrand approach.
• The highest optimal wholesale prices of products 1 and
3 are acquired under the MS-Stackelberg approach and
also for products 2 and 4 under the MS-Bertrand
approach in the first model. About the second model,
the highest optimal wholesale prices and optimal retail
prices of products 1, 2, 3, and 4 are achieved under the
MS-Stackelberg approach.
From Table 2, the following results can be obtained too.
• In the first model, manufacturers 1 and 3 achieve their
highest profits under the MS-Stackelberg approach and
the manufacturers 2 and 4 achieve their highest profits
under the MS-Bertrand approach. In the second model,
all the manufacturers achieve their highest profits under
the MS-Stackelberg approach.
• The retailers 1 and 2 achieve their highest profits using
MS-Bertrand game-theoretic approach in the first
model, and in the second model retailer 1 achieves
his highest profit applying MS-Stackelberg game and
retailer 2 achieves his highest profit using MS-Bertrand
game.
• The whole supply chain achieves the maximum profit
under the MS-Bertrand game-theoretic approach in the
first and the second models.
To study the effect of changing the parameter values on
the optimal values of the decision variables for this paper, a
sensitivity analysis is performed. The sensitivity analysis
for the first model is done only at the first echelon of supply
chain and for the second model is done only between
products 1 and 3. Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 show the results of
the first model under MS-Bertrand and MS-Stackelberg
policies, respectively.
The findings obtained from Tables 3 and 4 are sum-
marized as follows.
• W1 , W2 , P1, P2, D1, D2, pm1, pm2 and pr1 are
consumedly sensitive respect to the changes in param-
eters A1 and A2. When A1 and A2 are decreased by 25
and 50 %, all of decision variables decrease and vice
versa.
• W1 , W2 , P1, P2, pm1 and pm2 are consumedly sensitive
respect to the changes in parameters b11 and b22, while
D1, D2 and pr1 are moderately sensitive respect to the
changes in value of b11 and b22. When b11 and b22 are







2, pm1, pm2 and pr1 increase and vice
versa.
• W1 , W2 , P1, P2, D1, D2, pm1, pm2 and pr1 are
moderately sensitive respect to the changes in b12 and
b21. When b12 and b21 are decreased by 25 and 50 %,
all of the decision variables increase and vice versa.
• W1 , W2 , P1 and P2 are slightly sensitive respect to the
changes in parameters C1 and C2, while D1, D2, pm1,
pm2 and pr1 are moderately sensitive respect to the
changes in value of C1 and C2. When C1 and C2 are







while D1, D2, pm1, pm2 and pr1 increase and vice versa.
The results of Tables 5 and 6 are similar to the results of
Tables 3 and 4, except for sensitivity analysis of b11 and
b22. We assume manufacture 1 is the leader and manu-
facturer 2 is the follower. The results show W1 , P

1 and pm1
are consumedly sensitive respect to the changes in




2 and pm2 are slightly
sensitive respect to the changes in value of b11 and b22.





and pm1 increase while W2 , P

2 and pm2 decrease. Also,
sensitivity analysis is performed on the second model
under MS-Bertrand policy and its results are shown
Tables 7 and 8. Moreover the results of sensitivity analysis
of the second model under MS-Stackelberg are shown in
Tables 9 and 10.
The findings obtained from Tables 7 and 8 are sum-
marized as follows.
• W1 , W3 , P1, P3, D01, D03, p0m1, p0m3, p0r1 and p0r2 are
moderately sensitive respect to the changes in param-
eters A1 and A3. When A1 and A3 are decreased by 25
and 50 %, all of decision variables decrease and vice
versa.
• W1 , W3 , P1, P3, D01, D03, p0m1, p0m3, p0r1 and p0r2 are
consumedly sensitive respect to the changes in param-
eters b1 and b3. When b1 and b3 are decreased by 25
and 50 %, all of the decision variables increase and
vice versa.
• W1 , W3 , P1, P3, D01 and D03 are moderately sensitive







r2 are slightly sensitive respect to the
changes in parameters b13 and b31. When b13 and b31
Table 1 Optimal decision of
retail prices and wholesale
prices under different decision
scenarios















MS-Bertrand model 1 186.54 186.54 190.63 190.63 148.08 148.08 149.68 149.68
2 552.21 449.91 593.26 484.26 388.45 317.33 415.2 339.41
MS-Stackelberg model 1 193.29 184.51 197.27 188.69 161.59 144.02 162.97 145.8
2 555.97 452.59 601.48 490.3 391.04 319.18 429.38 349.92
126 J Ind Eng Int (2016) 12:119–135
123



















• W1 , W3 , P1, P3, D01, D03, p0m1, p0m3, p0r1 and p0r2 are
slightly sensitive respect to the changes in value of C1.




















increase and vice versa.
• W1 , W3 , P1, P3, D01, D03, p0m1, p0m3, p0r1 and p0r2 are
slightly sensitive respect to the changes in value of C3.




















increase and vice versa.
The results of Tables 9 and 10 are similar to the results
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r2 are slightly sensitive respect to
the changes in parameters b13 and b31. When b13 and b31

















r1 decrease and vice
versa.
Some of the sensitivity analyses in Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9 and 10 are illustrated by Figs. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and
12. Figures 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 show the effect of
some key parameters on optimal wholesale and retail prices
and also on the profit of the chain.
Conclusion
We discussed the pricing problem of two complementary
and substitutable products in a two-echelon supply chain
under two scenarios where two manufacturers and one
retailer are the members of each echelon. Under the first
scenario, which leads to develop the first model, the same
unit manufacturing costs for both echelons are supposed
and in the second one we assume that the unit manufac-
turing costs of echelons are different which causes to leak
demand from the echelon with higher unit manufacturing
cost to the lower one. Two same complementary products
Table 2 Maximum profits of the total system and for every firm under different decision scenarios
Decision scenario Model pm1 pm2 pm3 pm4 pr1 pr2 Total profit
MS-Bertrand model 1 3786.98 3786.98 5044.87 5044.87 2366.86 3186.23 23,216.79
2 29,758.21 23,253.79 35,148.92 27,760.29 23,953.38 28,442.13 1,68,352.72
MS-Stackelberg model 1 3824.39 3541.7 5088.86 47,47,071 2092.56 2839.66 22,134.88
2 30,184.27 23,548.64 35,227.14 27,788.51 24,279.06 26,633.38 1,67,661
Table 3 The sensitivity analysis for the first model in first echelon of supply chain under MS-Bertrand policy
















A1 ¼ A2 -50 78.85 78.85 95.67 95.67 13.46 13.46 -46.75 -46.75 -48.71 -48.71 -56.25 -56.25
-25 113.46 113.46 141.11 141.11 22.12 22.12 -23.38 -23.38 -24.36 -24.36 -28.13 -28.13
?25 182.69 182.69 231.97 231.97 39.42 39.42 23.38 23.38 24.36 24.36 28.13 28.13
?50 217.31 217.31 277.40 277.40 48.08 48.08 46.75 46.75 48.71 48.71 56.25 56.25
b11 ¼ b22 -50 232.81 232.81 280.04 280.04 25.98 25.98 57.22 57.22 50.13 50.13 -15.58 -15.58
-25 180.36 180.36 223.51 223.51 29.13 29.13 21.80 21.80 19.82 19.82 -5.33 -5.33
?25 126.21 126.21 160.40 160.40 31.63 31.63 -14.77 -14.77 -14.01 -14.01 2.79 2.79
?50 110.42 110.42 140.92 140.92 32.03 32.03 -25.43 -25.43 -24.45 -24.45 4.10 4.10
b12 ¼ b21 -50 167.39 167.39 222.16 222.16 35.60 35.60 13.04 13.04 19.09 19.09 15.69 15.69
-25 157.14 157.14 202.71 202.71 33.04 33.04 6.12 6.12 8.67 8.67 7.37 7.37
?25 140.00 140.00 172.86 172.86 28.75 28.75 -5.45 -5.45 -7.33 -7.33 -6.56 -6.56
?50 132.76 132.76 161.12 161.12 26.94 26.94 -10.34 -10.34 -13.63 -13.63 -12.45 -12.45
C1 ¼ C2 -50 143.27 143.27 184.13 184.13 32.69 32.69 -3.25 -3.25 -1.29 -1.29 6.25 6.25
-25 145.67 145.67 185.34 185.34 31.73 31.73 -1.62 -1.62 -0.64 -0.64 3.13 3.13
?25 150.48 150.48 187.74 187.74 29.81 29.81 1.62 1.62 0.64 0.64 -3.12 -3.12
?50 152.88 152.88 188.94 188.94 28.85 28.85 3.25 3.25 1.29 1.29 -6.25 -6.25
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are supplied to the market by each echelon of chain to
satisfy the customers’ demand. The model is developed
under price-sensitive and deterministic demand.
The main aim of this research is to analyze the pricing
decisions of the members of chain for complementary and
substitutable products with the different market powers
under two scenarios. In this research, two solution algo-
rithms including MS-Bertrand and MS-Stackelberg game-
theoretic approaches are presented to survey the effects of
the different market powers on the optimal value of deci-
sion variables and also the total profit of the supply chain
where the whole sale prices of manufacturers and the retail
prices of retailers are the decision variables of the proposed
models. Finally, a numerical example to show the appli-
cability of the proposed models is presented and we found
that the maximum profit of the whole supply chain is
obtained under MS-Bertrand approach in both proposed
models. For future works, the model can be extended under
Table 4 The sensitivity
analysis for the first models
profit functions in first echelon
of supply chain under MS-
Bertrand policy
Parameters % Changes Optimal values % Changes in
pm1 pm2 pr1 pm1 pm2 pr1
A1 ¼ A2 -50 724.85 724.85 453.03 -80.86 -80.86 -80.86
-25 1956.36 1956.36 1222.73 -48.34 -48.34 -48.34
?25 6216.72 6216.72 3885.45 64.16 64.16 64.16
?50 9245.56 9245.56 5778.48 144.14 144.14 144.14
b11 ¼ b22 -50 5398.25 5398.25 2453.75 42.55 42.55 3.67
-25 4525.47 4525.47 2514.15 19.50 19.50 6.22
?25 3201.06 3201.06 2162.88 -15.47 -15.47 -8.62
?50 2736.00 2736.00 1954.29 -27.75 -27.75 -17.43
b12 ¼ b21 -50 5068.82 5068.82 3899.09 33.85 33.85 64.74
-25 4365.43 4365.43 3010.64 15.27 15.27 27.20
?25 3306.25 3306.25 1889.29 -12.69 -12.69 -20.18
?50 2902.98 2902.98 1527.88 -23.34 -23.34 -35.45
C1 ¼ C2 -50 4275.15 4275.15 2671.97 12.89 12.89 12.89
-25 4027.37 4027.37 2517.10 6.35 6.35 6.35
?25 3553.99 3553.99 2221.25 -6.15 -6.15 -6.15
?50 3328.40 3328.40 2080.25 -12.11 -12.11 -12.11
Table 5 The sensitivity analysis for the first model in first echelon of supply chain under MS-Stackelberg policy
Parameters %
Changes
















A1 ¼ A2 -50 84.76 77.07 98.63 94.79 12.25 13.02 -47.55 -46.49 -48.97 -48.63 -56.25 -56.25
-25 123.17 110.55 145.96 139.65 20.13 21.39 -23.77 -23.24 -24.49 -24.31 -28.13 -28.13
?25 200 177.50 240.63 229.38 35.88 38.13 23.77 23.24 24.49 24.31 28.13 28.13
?50 238.41 210.98 287.96 274.24 43.75 46.49 47.55 46.49 48.97 48.63 56.25 56.25
b11 ¼ b22 -50 500.00 72.50 413.64 199.89 16.63 5.94 209.43 -49.66 113.9 8.33 -40.63 -80.05
-25 216.91 165.74 241.79 216.20 24.47 26.39 34.24 15.07 25.09 17.17 -12.61 -11.32
?25 132.80 124.63 163.70 159.61 29.81 31.13 -17.82 -13.47 -15.31 -13.50 6.45 4.63
?50 114.13 109.67 142.78 140.55 30.75 31.75 -29.37 -23.85 -26.13 -23.83 9.82 6.71
b12 ¼ b21 -50 170.75 166.89 223.83 221.91 34.80 35.47 5.67 15.87 15.80 20.27 24.27 19.21
-25 164.59 155.47 206.43 201.87 31.36 32.62 1.86 7.95 6.80 9.41 12.01 9.61
?25 162.50 131.56 184.11 168.64 24.71 26.64 0.57 -8.65 -4.75 -8.60 -11.76 -10.47
?50 169.43 116.26 179.45 152.86 21.48 22.81 4.86 -19.28 -7.16 -17.15 -23.27 -23.33
C1 ¼ C2 -50 157.62 138.96 191.31 181.98 29.75 31.62 -2.45 -3.51 -1.03 -1.37 6.25 6.25
-25 159.60 141.49 192.30 183.25 28.88 30.69 -1.23 -1.76 -0.51 -0.69 3.12 3.12
?25 163.57 146.55 194.28 185.78 27.13 28.83 1.226 1.757 0.513 0.686 -3.125 -3.125
?50 165.55 149.09 195.27 187.04 26.25 27.90 2.45 3.51 1.03 1.37 -6.25 -6.25
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Table 6 The sensitivity
analysis for the first models
profit functions in first echelon
of supply chain under MS-
Stackelberg policy
Parameters % Changes Optimal values % Changes in
pm1 pm2 pr1 pm1 pm2 pr1
A1 ¼ A2 -50 732.01 677.90 400.53 -80.86 -80.86 -80.86
-25 1975.69 1829.65 1081.02 -48.34 -48.34 -48.34
?25 6278.13 5814.06 3435.16 64.16 64.16 64.16
?50 9336.89 8646.73 5108.80 144.14 144.14 144.14
b11 ¼ b22 -50 7896.88 282.03 -679.44 106.49 -92.04 -132.47
-25 4695.84 3713.70 1940.40 22.79 4.86 -7.27
?25 3213.07 3101.82 2010.12 -15.98 -12.42 -3.94
?50 2740.76 2688.63 1861.40 -28.33 -24.09 -11.05
b12 ¼ b21 -50 5071.51 5033.06 3798.90 32.61 42.11 81.54
-25 4377.88 4255.48 2825.95 14.47 20.15 35.05
?25 3397.22 2838.89 1521.57 -11.17 -19.84 -27.29
?50 3103.05 2081.88 1050.48 -18.86 -41.22 -49.80
W -50 4317.38 3998.25 2362.31 12.89 12.89 12.89
-25 4067.15 3766.52 2225.39 6.35 6.35 6.35
?25 3589.10 3323.80 1963.82 -6.152 -6.152 -6.152
?50 3361.28 3112.82 1839.17 -12.11 -12.11 -12.11
Table 7 The sensitivity analysis for the second model between products 1 and 3 under MS-Bertrand policy
























A1 -50 268.66 360.37 378.45 513.72 54.89 76.68 -30.84 -13.21 -31.47 -13.41 -32.96 -13.88
-25 328.56 387.79 465.33 553.49 68.38 82.85 -15.42 -6.60 -15.73 -6.70 -16.48 -6.94
?25 448.35 442.62 639.08 633.04 95.37 95.21 15.42 6.60 15.73 6.70 16.48 6.94
?50 508.24 470.04 725.96 672.81 108.86 101.38 30.84 13.21 31.47 13.41 32.96 13.88
A3 -50 321.43 268.80 454.98 380.89 66.78 56.05 -17.25 -35.26 -17.61 -35.80 -18.44 -37.05
-25 354.94 342.00 503.59 487.08 74.33 72.54 -8.63 -17.63 -8.80 -17.90 -9.22 -18.52
?25 421.96 488.41 600.82 699.45 89.43 105.52 8.63 17.63 8.80 17.90 9.22 18.52
?50 455.48 561.61 649.43 805.63 96.98 122.01 17.25 35.26 17.61 35.80 18.44 37.05
b1 ¼ b3 -50 646.03 678.53 905.73 953.91 103.88 110.15 66.31 63.42 64.02 60.79 26.88 23.73
-25 484.51 513.82 685.55 729.87 90.47 97.22 24.73 23.75 24.15 23.03 10.49 9.20
?25 324.78 349.41 462.63 500.88 75.82 83.31 -16.39 -15.85 -16.22 -15.57 -7.40 -6.43
?50 279.50 302.31 398.26 434.05 71.26 79.05 -28.05 -27.19 -27.88 -26.84 -12.97 -11.21
b13 ¼ b31 -50 424.88 466.87 615.20 679.55 66.61 74.44 9.38 12.44 11.41 14.54 -18.64 -16.39
-25 405.98 438.69 582.12 632.26 74.86 82.27 4.51 5.66 5.42 6.57 -8.57 -7.60
?25 372.31 394.90 525.30 560.05 87.97 94.96 -4.16 -4.89 -4.87 -5.60 7.44 6.66
?50 357.45 376.97 501.05 531.16 93.34 100.22 -7.98 -9.21 -9.26 -10.47 14.00 12.57
C1 -50 381.99 414.02 548.46 591.55 83.24 88.76 -1.66 -0.28 -0.68 -0.29 1.66 -0.30
-25 385.22 414.61 550.33 592.41 82.56 88.90 -0.83 -0.14 -0.34 -0.14 0.83 -0.15
?25 391.69 415.80 554.08 594.12 81.20 89.16 0.83 0.14 0.34 0.14 --0.83 0.15
?50 394.92 416.39 555.95 594.98 80.52 89.30 1.66 0.28 0.68 0.29 -1.66 0.30
C3 -50 387.51 410.03 550.83 590.27 81.66 90.12 -0.24 -1.25 -0.25 -0.51 -0.26 1.22
-25 387.98 412.62 551.52 591.76 81.77 89.57 -0.12 -0.62 -0.12 -0.25 -0.13 0.61
?25 388.93 417.79 552.89 594.76 81.98 88.49 0.12 0.62 0.12 0.25 0.13 -0.61
?50 389.40 420.38 553.58 596.26 82.09 87.94 0.24 1.25 0.25 0.51 0.26 -1.22
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stochastic demand and also considering competing retailers
can develop and enhance our models.
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Appendix 1: Notations of the first model
The notations employed to solving the first model which is
developed under the first scenario are as follows:
F1 ¼ 2b22A1  A2 b12 þ b21ð Þ
4b11b22  b12 þ b21ð Þ2
ð75Þ
F2 ¼ 2b11b22  b12 b12 þ b21ð Þ
4b11b22  b12 þ b21ð Þ2
ð76Þ
F3 ¼ 2b21b22  b22 b12 þ b21ð Þ
4b11b22  b12 þ b21ð Þ2
ð77Þ
F4 ¼ 2b11A2  A1 b12 þ b21ð Þ
4b11b22  b12 þ b21ð Þ2
ð78Þ
F5 ¼ 2b11b12  b11 b12 þ b21ð Þ
4b11b22  b12 þ b21ð Þ2
ð79Þ
F6 ¼ 2b11b22  b21 b12 þ b21ð Þ
4b11b22  b12 þ b21ð Þ2
ð80Þ
U1 ¼ 2b44A3  A4 b34 þ b43ð Þ
4b33b44  b34 þ b43ð Þ2
ð81Þ
U2 ¼ 2b33b44  b34 b34 þ b43ð Þ
4b33b44  b34 þ b43ð Þ2
ð82Þ
U3 ¼ 2b43b44  b44 b34 þ b43ð Þ
4b33b44  b34 þ b43ð Þ2
ð83Þ
Table 8 The sensitivity analysis for the second models profit functions between products 1 and 3 under MS-Bertrand policy
















A1 -50 13,375.09 26,097.77 10,684.74 21,146.28 -55.05 -25.83 -55.39 -25.65
-25 20,758.53 30,471.97 16,658.45 24,659.28 -30.24 -13.39 -30.45 -13.30
?25 40,374.13 40,236.60 32,569.53 32,494.82 35.67 14.36 35.97 14.25
?50 52,606.30 45,627.02 42,506.89 36,817.36 76.78 29.68 77.46 29.45
A3 -50 19,794.57 13,944.55 15,970.80 11,198.29 -33.48 -60.37 -33.33 -60.63
-25 24,523.38 23,357.54 19,760.54 18,833.38 -17.59 -33.61 -17.50 -33.78
?25 35,499.05 49,426.68 28,549.32 40,024.55 19.29 40.48 19.19 40.72
?50 41,745.91 66,082.84 33,548.37 53,580.65 40.28 87.82 40.06 88.38
b1 ¼ b3 -50 64,513.33 72,539.66 37,524.14 42,924.35 116.79 106.17 56.65 50.92
-25 41,570.01 48,010.27 28,732.71 33,594.07 39.69 36.45 19.95 18.11
?25 22,728.34 27,442.13 20,996.81 25,208.06 -23.62 -22.01 -12.34 -11.37
?50 18,135.18 22,315.55 19,008.92 23,003.51 -39.06 -36.58 -20.64 -19.12
b13 ¼ b31 -50 26,636.86 33,264.08 23,223.27 28,421.15 -10.49 -5.46 -3.05 -0.07
-25 28,519.45 34,444.19 23,731.11 28,514.01 -4.16 -2.11 -0.93 -0.25
?25 30,552.90 35,600.53 24,004.62 28,271.89 2.67 1.18 0.21 0.60
?50 31,030.40 35,775.83 23,948.88 28,042.33 4.28 1.68 0.02 1.41
C1 -50 30,754.43 34,974.61 24,843.31 28,258.19 3.35 -0.60 3.72 -0.65
-25 30,254.27 35,079.69 24,396.29 28,350.08 1.67 -0.30 1.85 -0.32
?25 29,266.25 35,290.31 23,514.57 28,534.32 -1.65 0.30 -1.83 0.32
?50 28,778.38 35,395.86 23,079.87 28,626.67 -3.29 0.60 -3.65 0.65
C3 -50 29,603.45 36,049.64 23,818.34 29,216.22 -0.52 2.46 -0.56 2.72
-25 29,680.78 35,615.97 23,885.81 28,827.86 -0.26 1.23 -0.28 1.36
?25 29,835.74 34,756.49 24,021.04 28,059.03 0.26 -1.22 0.28 -1.35
?50 29,913.37 34,330.69 24,088.80 27,678.55 0.52 -2.43 0.57 -2.68
130 J Ind Eng Int (2016) 12:119–135
123
U4 ¼ 2b33A4  A3 b34 þ b43ð Þ
4b33b44  b34 þ b43ð Þ2
ð84Þ
U5 ¼ 2b33b34  b33 b34 þ b43ð Þ
4b33b44  b34 þ b43ð Þ2
ð85Þ
U6 ¼ 2b33b44  b43 b34 þ b43ð Þ
4b33b44  b34 þ b43ð Þ2
ð86Þ
E1 ¼ A1 þ b11 C1F2  F1ð Þ þ b12 C1F5  F4ð Þ ð87Þ
E2 ¼ A2 þ b22 C2F6  F4ð Þ þ b21 C2F3  F1ð Þ ð88Þ
E3 ¼ b11F3 þ b12F6 ð89Þ
E4 ¼ 2 b11F2 þ b12F5ð Þ ð90Þ
E5 ¼ b22F5 þ b21F2 ð91Þ
E6 ¼ 2 b22F6 þ b21F3ð Þ ð92Þ






E8 ¼ E4E6  2E3E5 ð94Þ
G1 ¼ A3 þ b33 C3U2  U1ð Þ þ b34 C3U5  U4ð Þ ð95Þ
G2 ¼ A4 þ b44 C4U6  U4ð Þ þ b43 C4U3  U1ð Þ ð96Þ
G3 ¼ b33U3 þ b34U6 ð97Þ
G4 ¼ 2 b33U2 þ b34U5ð Þ ð98Þ
G5 ¼ b44U5 þ b43U2 ð99Þ
G6 ¼ 2 b44U6 þ b43U3ð Þ ð100Þ






G8 ¼ G4G6  2G3G5 ð102Þ
Appendix 2: Notations of the second model
The notations employed to solve the second model
which is developed under the second scenario are as
follows:
K1 ¼ 2A1 b3 þ L1ð Þ þ L1A3
4 b1 þ L1ð Þ b3 þ L1ð Þ  L21
ð103Þ
Table 9 The sensitivity analysis for the second model between products 1 and 3 under MS-Stackelberg policy
























A1 -50 270.90 372.57 381.69 520.79 55.39 74.11 -30.72 -13.23 -31.35 -13.41 -32.82 -13.88
-25 330.97 400.97 468.83 561.14 68.93 80.08 -15.36 -6.61 -15.67 -6.71 -16.41 -6.94
?25 451.12 457.78 643.11 641.82 95.99 92.02 30.72 13.23 31.35 13.41 32.82 13.88
?50 511.19 486.18 730.25 682.17 109.53 97.99 30.72 13.23 31.35 13.41 32.82 13.88
A3 -50 323.06 277.72 457.35 386.06 67.15 54.17 -17.39 -35.32 -17.74 -35.81 -18.57 -37.05
-25 357.05 353.55 506.66 493.77 74.80 70.11 -8.69 -17.66 -8.87 -17.91 -9.29 -18.52
?25 425.04 505.21 605.27 709.19 90.12 101.99 8.69 17.66 8.87 17.91 9.29 18.52
?50 459.03 581.04 654.58 816.89 97.78 117.93 17.39 35.32 17.74 35.81 18.57 37.05
b1 ¼ b3 -50 659.56 730.40 924.92 987.05 106.14 102.66 68.67 70.11 66.36 64.10 28.72 19.30
-25 489.86 538.79 693.24 744.92 91.52 92.76 25.27 25.48 24.69 23.85 10.99 7.79
?25 326.21 358.32 464.71 505.90 76.18 81.17 -16.58 -16.55 -16.41 -15.89 -7.62 -5.67
?50 280.35 308.32 399.52 437.37 71.50 77.43 -28.31 -28.19 -28.14 -27.28 -13.29 -10.01
b13 ¼ b31 -50 425.64 473.27 616.32 682.99 66.74 73.40 8.85 10.22 10.86 13.55 -19.07 -14.70
-25 407.58 449.10 584.46 638.08 75.17 80.32 4.23 4.59 5.13 6.09 -8.84 -6.66
?25 375.95 412.49 530.55 570.55 88.89 90.89 -3.86 -3.93 -4.57 -5.14 7.80 5.62
?50 362.15 397.60 507.77 543.80 94.66 95.03 -7.39 -7.40 -8.67 -9.59 14.79 10.43
C1 -50 384.57 428.15 552.21 599.74 83.82 85.79 -1.66 -0.29 -0.68 -0.29 1.65 -0.30
-25 387.81 428.76 554.09 600.61 83.14 85.92 -0.83 -0.14 -0.34 -0.14 0.82 -0.15
?25 394.28 429.99 557.85 602.35 81.78 86.18 0.83 0.14 0.34 0.14 -0.82 0.15
?50 397.52 430.60 559.73 603.22 81.10 86.31 1.66 0.29 0.68 0.29 -1.65 0.30
C3 -50 390.13 424.38 554.64 598.58 82.25 87.10 -0.23 -1.16 -0.24 -0.48 -0.25 1.22
-25 390.59 426.88 555.30 600.03 82.36 86.58 -0.12 -0.58 -0.12 -0.24 -0.12 0.61
?25 391.50 431.88 556.63 602.93 82.56 85.52 0.12 0.58 0.12 0.24 0.12 -0.61
?50 391.96 434.38 557.29 604.38 82.67 85.00 0.23 1.16 0.24 0.48 0.25 -1.22
J Ind Eng Int (2016) 12:119–135 131
123
K2 ¼ L1 b3 þ L1ð Þ
4 b1 þ L1ð Þ b3 þ L1ð Þ  L21
ð104Þ
K3 ¼ 2 b1 þ L1ð Þ b3 þ L1ð Þ
4 b1 þ L1ð Þ b3 þ L1ð Þ  L21
ð105Þ
K4 ¼ 2A2 b4 þ L2ð Þ þ L2A4
4 b2 þ L2ð Þ b4 þ L2ð Þ  L22
ð106Þ
K5 ¼ L2 b4 þ L2ð Þ
4 b2 þ L2ð Þ b4 þ L2ð Þ  L22
ð107Þ
Table 10 The sensitivity analysis for the second models profit functions between products 1 and 3 under MS-Stackelberg policy
















A1 -50 13,621.34 26,129.09 10,872.51 19,801.64 -54.87 -25.83 -55.22 -25.65
-25 21,089.82 30,508.54 16,911.46 23,091.18 -30.13 -13.39 -30.35 -13.30
?25 40,904.68 40,284.89 32,975.31 30,428.27 76.42 29.68 77.11 29.45
?50 53,251.06 45,681.78 43,000.22 34,475.82 76.42 29.68 77.11 29.45
A3 -50 20,013.16 13,961.28 16,137.56 10,485.95 -33.70 -60.37 -33.53 -60.63
-25 24,838.40 23,385.57 20,001.17 17,635.55 -17.71 -33.61 -17.62 -33.78
?25 36,050.76 49,486.00 28,971.21 37,479.43 19.44 40.48 19.33 40.72
?50 42,437.88 66,162.14 34,077.64 50,173.70 40.60 87.82 40.36 88.39
b1 ¼ b3 -50 67,355.56 72,928.53 38,846.42 38,170.52 123.15 107.02 60.00 43.32
-25 42,543.71 48,121.73 29,292.42 30,943.81 40.95 36.60 20.65 16.18
?25 22,945.30 27,461.18 21,230.29 23,803.16 -23.98 -22.05 -12.56 -10.63
?50 18,257.67 22,325.24 19,199.80 21,817.21 -39.51 -36.62 -20.92 -18.08
b13 ¼ b31 -50 26,737.51 33,270.70 23,404.89 27,217.93 -11.42 -5.55 -3.60 2.19
-25 28,759.93 34,464.48 23,976.00 27,002.80 -4.72 -2.16 -1.25 1.39
?25 31,196.96 35,672.14 24,422.05 26,190.14 3.36 1.26 0.59 -1.66
?50 31,913.39 35,882.98 24,463.99 25,716.92 5.73 1.86 0.76 -3.44
C1 -50 31,186.24 35,016.58 25,173.85 26,461.11 3.32 -0.60 3.69 -0.65
-25 30,683.21 35,121.78 24,724.41 26,547.17 1.65 -0.30 1.83 -0.32
?25 29,689.42 35,332.66 23,837.81 26,719.73 -1.64 0.30 -1.82 0.32
?50 29,198.66 35,438.33 23,400.65 26,806.23 -3.27 0.60 -3.62 0.65
C3 -50 30,033.62 36,092.90 24,147.48 27,358.45 -0.50 2.46 -0.54 2.72
-25 30,108.90 35,658.71 24,213.22 26,994.69 -0.25 1.23 -0.27 1.36
?25 30,259.74 34,798.20 24,344.98 26,274.54 0.25 -1.22 0.27 -1.35












Fig. 4 Changes of optimal prices with respect to A1 ¼ A2 for the first












Fig. 5 Changes of optimal prices with respect to b11 ¼ b22 for the
first model under MS-Bertrand policy
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K6 ¼ 2 b2 þ L2ð Þ b4 þ L2ð Þ
4 b2 þ L2ð Þ b4 þ L2ð Þ  L22
ð108Þ
K7 ¼ 2A3 b1 þ L1ð Þ þ L1A1
4 b1 þ L1ð Þ b3 þ L1ð Þ  L21
ð109Þ
K8 ¼ L1 b1 þ L1ð Þ
4 b1 þ L1ð Þ b3 þ L1ð Þ  L21
ð110Þ
K9 ¼ 2A4 b2 þ L2ð Þ þ L2A2
4 b2 þ L2ð Þ b4 þ L2ð Þ  L22
ð111Þ
K10 ¼ L2 b2 þ L2ð Þ
4 b2 þ L2ð Þ b4 þ L2ð Þ  L22
ð112Þ
N1 ¼ A1  b1K1  L1 K1  K7ð Þ
















Fig. 6 Changes of maximum profits with respect to A1 ¼ A2 for the











Fig. 7 Changes of optimal prices with respect to b12 ¼ b21 for the











Fig. 8 Changes of optimal prices with respect to C1 ¼ C2 for the first














Fig. 9 Changes of optimal prices with respect to A1 for the second












Fig. 10 Changes of optimal prices with respect to b1 ¼ b3 for the














Fig. 11 Changes of maximum profits with respect to C1 for the
second model under MS-Stackelberg policy
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N2 ¼ A3  b3K7  L1 K7  K1ð Þ
þ C3 b3K3 þ L1K3  L1K2ð Þ ð114Þ
N3 ¼ b1K2 þ L1K2  L1K3 ð115Þ
N4 ¼ 2 b1K3 þ L1K3  L1K8ð Þ ð116Þ
N5 ¼ b3K8 þ L1K8  L1K3 ð117Þ
N6 ¼ 2 b3K3 þ L1K3  L1K2ð Þ ð118Þ
N7 ¼ A2  b2K4  L2 K4  K9ð Þ
þ C2 b2K6 þ L2K6  L2K10ð Þ ð119Þ
N8 ¼ A4  b4K9  L2 K9  K4ð Þ
þ C4 b4K6 þ L2K6  L2K5ð Þ ð120Þ
N9 ¼ b2K5 þ L2K5  L2K6 ð121Þ
N10 ¼ 2 b2K6 þ L2K6  L2K10ð Þ ð122Þ
N11 ¼ b4K10 þ L2K10  L2K6 ð123Þ
N12 ¼ 2 b4K6 þ L2K6  L2K5ð Þ ð124Þ






N14 ¼ N4N6  2N3N5 ð126Þ






N16 ¼ N10N12  2N9N11 ð128Þ
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